Overview
I work on bioethics and normative ethics.
In bioethics, my work concerns the ethics of medical research with human subjects, and specifically the benefits and burdens of participating in medical research. It focuses especially on issues concerning risk, social value, compensation, and altruism. The questions I am working on include:
How much risk is it acceptable to impose on research participants?
What is the relation between risk limits for those who can and those who cannot provide consent?
When is it permissible to rely on participants’ altruism?
(How much) should human subjects be paid for participating in research?
Is there an obligation to participate in research?
What place do market norms have in the ethical conduct of research?
In normative ethics, I work on (1) the nature of imperfect duties and their role in interpersonal relationships, as well as (2) questions concerning risk impositions and consent. In previous work, I explored the relation between perfect and imperfect duties, defending a novel account of imperfect duties. In current and future research, I address questions including:
What explains the moral force of particular imperfect duties, such as beneficence and gratitude?
What role do imperfect duties play in developing personal relationships?
What role do conventional norms have in explaining the moral force of imperfect duties?
Do individuals have rights against being subjected to risks?
What is the relation between the capacity to consent and how much risk others can permissibly impose on individuals?
What kinds of risks can we permissibly impose on future generations?
Publications
Segal AE. Gratitude for What We are Owed, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2025.
Under review
Segal AE. Gratitude and Demand
Explains why duties of gratitude don’t provide benefactors with the standing to demand gratitude from beneficiaries
Segal AE. The Indeterminacy of Imperfect Duties
Explains why imperfect duties’ indeterminacy is consistent with sometimes requiring particular actions
Segal AE, Wendler D. The Ethical Limits on Research Risks
Justifies limits on research risks for consenting adults by appealing to internal limits on the power of consent, written for a medical audience
Segal AE, Li X, Wendler D. Public Perspectives on Compensation for Biospecimen Donation
Investigates the public’s ethical views on profit sharing in research using biospecimens
Segal AE, Li X, Wendler D. The Impact of Compensation on Biospecimen Donors’ Attitudes, Motivations, and Willingness to Donate
Investigates the potential impacts on biospecimen donors of profit sharing in research using biospecimens
Segal AE, Hawkins J, Wendler D, Howard D. Supported Decision Making and the Inclusion of People who Lack Decisional Capacity in Greater than Minimal Risk Research
Explains why implementing supported decision making can improve clinical trials’ inclusion of people who lack decisional capacity
Hawkins J, Segal AE, Wendler D, Howard D. The Importance of Control: Replacing Surrogate Decision Making with Supported Decision Making for Minimal Risk Research
Argues that implementing supported decision making can diminish burdens of capacity assessment in minimal risk research
In progress
Segal AE. How to Exploit an Altruist
Explains how altruistic research participants can be exploited when there are inequalities of bargaining power between them and research institutions
Segal AE. Evidence, Alternatives, and the Prospect of Direct Benefit
Argues for an account of permissibly risky pediatric research in terms of risk-benefit ratios
Voorhoeve A, Segal AE, Wendler D. Altruism and Impaired Agency: The Case of Williams Syndrome
Argues that it is justifiable for researchers to appeal to research participants’ altruism, including when they lack decisional capacity
Segal AE, Earl J, Villa T, Rid A. Communicating Social Value
Argues that researchers should disclose the expected social value of their studies to prospective participants as part of the informed consent process
Segal AE. Making Trouble for the Right against Risk
Argues that “high risk” views of the right against risk are vulnerable to counterexamples, and thus that if there is a right against risk, it it not strictly a function of risks themselves